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INTRODUCTION
Floods are the most expensive form of natural disaster in the United States.1
Climate change and population growth are likely to lead in the coming decades to
more severe, frequent, and costly floods.2 How we pay for flood losses is an
urgent public policy issue. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
provides most of the flood insurance policies on homes in the United States.3 The
U.S. Flood Insurance Program is a complex scheme that uses insurance coverage
subsidies, mandates, and other tools to support various policies related to floods; 4
in other words, it uses insurance to govern.5 Yet, the governance of the NFIP is
limited; powerful factors constrain its impact, and the policies it furthers have long
been criticized.6 This Article first showcases key aspects of the NFIP, including its
structure and goals.7 Then it shifts to consider constraints on the almost fifty-yearold NFIP8 and outlines the current status of this program.9 Finally, it considers
what sort of federal governmental involvement with insurance would be better for
dealing with homeowners’ flood risk than the current system.10 In trying to reform
the NFIP, Congress has gone in circles between 2012 and 2014 and will again

1. Flood Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Nov. 2015), http://www.iii.org/issue-update/floodinsurance [https://perma.cc/9FTL-5GGT].
2. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-359T, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN
UPDATE 1, 14–20, 61–74 (2013) (adding to the GAO’s high-risk list the following: “Limiting the
Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks”); FEMA, 2011OPPA-01, FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY STATEMENT (2011) (outlining the
agency-wide directive too integrate climate change adaptation planning, including planning for more
intense storms, extreme flooding, and higher sea levels in its processes); AECOM, THE IMPACT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM THROUGH 2100 (2013).
3. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-497T, GAO’S HIGH RISK PROGRAM
(2006); Flood Insurance, supra note 1.
4. See infra Part I.
5. An important literature has developed in recent years, largely focused on private insurance,
which conceptualizes insurance as governance. See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE &
DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003); Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of
Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 683–93 (2013). United States federal flood insurance, which is
publicly underwritten yet privately purchased, is also an example of insurance as governance. In this
Article, I use a broad conception of governance and governing that embraces incentives and impacts
of insurance, as well as explicit rules and regulations.
6. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood Insurance Reform in a
Warming World, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 361, 384–97 (2014).
7. See infra Sections I.A., I.B. For a more detailed discussion regarding federal flood insurance,
see Wriggins, supra note 6.
8. See infra Section I.C.
9. See infra Section I.D.
10. See infra Part II.
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consider reforms in 2017.11 Risk-based rates based on state-of-the-art maps and a
small, means-based voucher program rather than the current general subsidies are
reforms that both make sense and would be workable if introduced gradually.12 A
comprehensive plan to address rising sea levels and other aspects of climate
change is also a necessary, although unlikely, reform. In the meantime, a better
flood insurance program can begin to steer us in the right direction.13
I.

THE NFIP: BASIC BACKGROUND

The NFIP, founded in 1968, was a product of the Great Society and the shift
in government risk management that evolved from the 1930s to the 1960s.14 In
this shift, the federal government took an active role in managing and spreading
risks that previously had been shouldered by individuals and localities.15 Federal
disaster relief, which had begun in 1927 with a devastating Mississippi flood, had
been ballooning.16 Congress hoped its new program would result in lower disaster
relief bills by making development safer or guiding development away from floodprone areas and by bearing and sharing flood risk among the residents of risky
areas who purchased insurance.17 Congress also aimed to supply flood insurance
“in flood-prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to
obtain it” under “reasonable” terms and conditions18 but failed to define the
meaning of “reasonable.”19 To encourage participation in the new program, it

11. The 2012 reforms were known as the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100201–49, 126 Stat. 405, 916–69 (2012) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012)). Then, in 2014, Congress passed the Menendez-Grimm Homeowners’
Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014,
Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§ 3–4, 128 Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (2014) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014(g), 4015).
12. See infra Section II.A–D.
13. See infra Section II.A–C.
14. DAVID MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK
MANAGER 258–62 (2002).
15. Id.
16. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 372–73.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-631T,
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS
FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES (2010) [hereinafter NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED ];
see HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., AT WAR WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE
RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES 84 (2009); Wriggins, supra note 6, at 375.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
19. Id.
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provided deep subsidies for the oldest, highest-risk properties.20 Congress also
envisioned that a unified national floodplain management plan would eventually
be developed and passed.21
A. Broad Structure of the NFIP
The NFIP is a complex governmental insurance program with both public
and private aspects. First, the federal government has chosen to make flood
insurance coverage available to homeowners, covering a risk that the private
market was not insuring when the law establishing the NFIP passed in 1968.22
Although it may seem surprising now, the NFIP was designed to run a deficit
during years when floods were huge.23 Deficits would be funded through loans
from the Treasury Department.24 Currently, the deficit is twenty-four billion
dollars with no expectation it will be paid back without changes in the program.25
Second, risk reduction policies were a part of the NFIP from the beginning. For
example, the NFIP made the availability of flood insurance to communities
contingent on the passing of risk reduction ordinances in those communities.26 If
communities passed ordinances acceptable to the NFIP, such as requiring new
construction to be elevated in a flood zone, residents of these communities would
be able to buy federal flood insurance. In addition, the NFIP provided funds to
participating communities for risk reduction.27 This arrangement of offering flood
insurance, which was unavailable on the market, to communities that adopted
policies aimed at reducing flood risk comprises the basic structure of the NFIP.

20. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-607, FLOOD INSURANCE:
MORE INFORMATION NEEDED ON SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES (2013) [hereinafter MORE
INFORMATION NEEDED]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-297, FEMA ACTION
NEEDED TO IMPROVE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 52
(2011) [hereinafter FEMA ACTION NEEDED] (reporting that rates for older properties in high-risk
zones are forty to forty-five percent of what full risk rates would be); FEMA, QUESTIONS ABOUT
THE BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012 (n.d.), http://www.fema.gov/
[https://perma.cc/8SEAmedia-library-data/20130726-1912-25045-9380/bw12_qa_04_2013.pdf
QNN7]; Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26
MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 15–16 (2007).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c).
22. MOSS, supra note 14, at 262; Scales, supra note 20, at 7.
23. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 6 (“As we have pointed out,
the number of policies receiving subsidized rates has grown steadily in recent years and without
changes to the program will likely continue to grow, increasing the potential for future NFIP
operating deficits.”).
24. Id.
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-127, FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES
FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT 1 (2014) [hereinafter FLOOD INSURANCE:
STRATEGIES].
26. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 84–85; Scales, supra note 20, at 12.
27. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-429T, FLOOD INSURANCE: PUBLIC
POLICY GOALS PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM (2011) [hereinafter PUBLIC POLICY GOALS].
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B. Other Key Aspects of the NFIP: Mandates, Subsidies, and Consequences
The federal government, by selling flood insurance, has decided to sell a
product that people must be forced to buy even when it is sold at less than half
price. When Congress created the NFIP in 1968, it assumed that communities
would voluntarily participate in the federal flood program, and that homeowners
would eagerly buy flood insurance, which had previously been unavailable.
Congress even required deep subsidies for policies on the highest-risk properties,
including second homes and homes that had repeatedly suffered flood losses.28
These high-risk properties were homes that had been built in flood-prone areas
without flood risk in mind and before flood maps had been developed.29 But
because community and homeowner interest was minimal, the program would
have quickly failed without reform.30
Congress in the 1970s and 1980s reformed the program by adding mandates
for homeowners and banks.31 Homeowners in high-risk zones who had mortgages
were required to keep flood insurance for the life of the mortgage; similarly, banks
had to ensure flood insurance was retained for the duration of all loans in flood
zones.32 The goal was for the mandates to help create a pool of funds out of
which flood losses could be paid.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administered
the program, later expanded the subsidies for policies on high-risk properties.33
FEMA decided, for example, that when flood maps changed in such a way that a
property, which had been located in a low-risk zone, was remapped into a highrisk zone, the initial lower rate would continue to apply to the property.34 These
28. The subsidized rates charged by the NFIP are estimated as between thirty-five and fortyfive percent of what risk-based rates would be. FEMA ACTION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 52
(reporting that rates for older properties in high-risk zones are forty to forty-five percent of what full
risk rates would be).
29. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 1, 9; Scales, supra note 20, at 42. The
subsidies are known as pre-FIRM, or pre-Flood Insurance Rate Map, subsidies.
30. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra
note 17, at 86.
31. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra
note 17, at 86.
32. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra
note 17, at 86. For properties (mortgaged or unmortgaged) outside high-risk zones or unmortgaged
properties within high-risk zones, there is no purchase mandate. Charlene Luke & Aviva
Abramovsky, Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1,
13–16 (2011).
33. See Implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Act of 2012: One Year After Enactment:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Econ. Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th
Cong. 9–30 (2013) (written testimony of W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency) [hereinafter FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony] (explaining types of
subsidies); NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7, 14.
34. PUBLIC POLICY GOALS, supra note 27, at 3–4; Scales, supra note 20, at 15–16; FEMA
Administrator 2013 Written Testimony, supra note 33, at 10. A related type of subsidy also known as a
grandfathering subsidy was applied when a property was built in compliance with FEMA standards in
a flood zone. When the risk of that zone increased even further, the property still would be charged
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types of subsidies, known as grandfathering subsidies, meant that even more highrisk properties were charged rates below their risk, and thus that the program’s
deficits were likely to be greater in the event of large floods.35
The mandates are a straightforward mechanism by which Congress governs
through insurance, where individuals are required to participate in a specific riskspreading mechanism.36 The subsidies, too, are meant to incentivize the purchase
of insurance. Congress assumes that encouraging the purchase of insurance is a
good idea because it forces people to bear at least some of the costs of living
where they do. As the reasoning goes, homeowners who share flood risk and thus
have insurance for that risk will bear at least some of the costs of rebuilding
following a flood.
In providing deeply discounted rates on the oldest and riskiest properties,
Congress discouraged replacing and mitigating these properties.37 In fact,
Congress’s policies unfortunately encouraged homeowners to retain these
properties.38 After floods, flood insurance benefits were often used to repair
existing homes rather than replace them with new, more flood-resistant homes.39
Thus, the number of older, risky homes remained higher than it would be if
people actually had to pay the full cost of flood insurance on those homes.40 Many
see this retention of older, risky homes as a negative effect of the insurance,
leading to more losses in the long run.41 Federal regulations provided that if
completed repairs or renovations were worth less than half of a home’s value,

lower rates based on the earlier compliance rather than the current risk. See FEMA Administrator 2013
Written Testimony, supra note 33, at 10; see also NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at
7, 14. This is the type of subsidy most commonly referred to as “grandfathering.” See NFIP:
CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7. The “pre-FIRM” subsidies are sometimes
referred to as “grandfathered” also. See FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony, supra note 33, at
10.
35. FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony, supra note 33, at 10; PUBLIC POLICY GOALS,
supra note 27, at 3–4; NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7, 14; Scales, supra
note 20, at 15.
36. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 683–93 (describing the conception of private insurance as
“governing” its policyholders and in part acting as a surrogate government). See generally ERICSON,
DOYLE & BARRY, supra note 5 at 43–65 (describing private insurance practices as creating a system of
governance, including by collaboration with the federal government).
37. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 393–95; see CAMILO SARMIENTO & TED R. MILLER, AM. INST.
FOR RESEARCH, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING AND THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, at x (2006), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1602[https://perma.cc/3X3B-GLK6];
20490-4555/nfip_eval_costs_and_consequences.pdf
FRENCH
WETMORE ET AL., AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH, THE EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT, at xi, 10, 12–14 (2006), http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/20130726-1602-20490-1463/nfip_eval_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ5E-8FT5].
38. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 393–95; see SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at x;
WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at x, 10, 12–14.
39. See SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at vi–xiii; WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at
22–24.
40. See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 393–95.
41. See id.
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such home did not need to meet the standards for flood resistance after repairs.42
Not surprisingly, this created perverse incentives for property owners to minimize
renovations so as not to be required to make homes more flood-resistant.43 When
it created the flood program in 1968, Congress expected that the older housing
stock on which it was giving subsidies would be replaced within approximately
twenty-five years.44 But this has not happened. There are still about 3.5 million of
these older structures and their turnover is very low.45 Relatedly, flood insurance
has been found to inflate the market value of these older buildings, discouraging
their replacement by newer, more flood-resistant structures.46 Thus, a negative
consequence of the NFIP has been the retention by private homeowners of older,
less flood-resistant buildings in flood-prone areas.
While the NFIP has encouraged private parties to build in flood-prone areas,
it also has helped make new buildings in flood-prone areas more resistant to
floods.47 For example, most new construction in high-risk areas is elevated in
accordance with NFIP requirements.48 The NFIP’s actions have been estimated to
reduce costs from flooding by about one billion dollars per year.49 However, the
program has probably simultaneously encouraged building in flood-prone areas,
putting more property at risk. While one of the program’s many goals was guiding
development away from floodplains, the program has instead encouraged building
in floodplains, albeit while making doing so safer.50 One consequence has been
more new development in flood-prone areas than there would have been without
the NFIP.51
The NFIP has created maps showing flood risk throughout the United
States. Prior to the federal flood program, there existed no mapping for flood risk,
yet maps of flood risks are useful planning tools.52 The program developed rates
based on its flood risk maps.53 Throughout its history, the mapping program has

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 60.3(c)(2) (2015).
See WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at 22–24.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 22–23.
SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at x.
WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at xi.
Id. at 16.
See id. at 9; SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at 8.
See WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at 12–20. See generally Wriggins, supra note 6, at 384–

86.
51. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L.
REV. 61, 73, 160 (1985); see SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 37, at x; WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37,
at x, 9, 12–14; Scales, supra note 20, at 13.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 4010(a) (2012) (administrator of NFIP required to identify flood risk zones
within 5 years of 1968); NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7; KUNREUTHER
ET AL., supra note 17, at 84–85; Houck, supra note 51, at 71 n.49 (stating accelerated mapping program
passed in 1973), 74 (stating that FEMA prepares maps), 159 (stating program has evolved to at least
the flood-map phase in thousands of communities); Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 32, at 18 n.94.
53. See NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra
note 137, at 84–85.
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been underfunded, subject to political pressure, and technically subpar.54 Rates
based on faulty maps are inherently suspect, and inferior mapping has contributed
to a suspicion of, and hostility toward, the federal flood program.55
C. Constraints on the NFIP
The NFIP faces various limitations and constraints because of the structure
of the U.S. government, the nature of the provided insurance, and the all-toocommon human behavior toward risk, where people tend to underestimate the
magnitude of low-probability, high-impact events like floods.
First, land use is primarily a local and state matter.56 The federal government
cannot enforce local building codes.57 Enforcement of local building codes in
flood-prone areas is sometimes lax.58 When the NFIP provides funds for local
communities to make buildings more flood-resistant and the communities do not
use the money for this purpose, NFIP cannot get its money back.59 Thus, the
NFIP is underwriting a risk over which it has little control.
Moreover, the NFIP has not been able to exclude high-risk properties from
the pool or charge all high-risk properties a higher rate as a commercial insurer
would.60 The law has strictly controlled the rates that can be charged for flood
insurance.61 The NFIP has been required to sell insurance to all who will pay for
it.62 For example, people in high-risk zones who do not have mortgages are
voluntary purchasers; though their rates may be high, the NFIP cannot refuse to
sell them insurance. While the NFIP might want to keep costs down by refusing
to insure these high-risk properties, excluding them from the pool of insureds is
not allowed by the law that establishes and defines the rules that govern the
NFIP.63

54. See Houck, supra note 51, 159–63.
55. See, e.g., Christie Thompson et al., Fed Flood Maps Left NY Unprepared for Sandy—and
FEMA Knew It, WNYC RADIO (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.wnyc.org/story/fed-flood-maps-left-nyunprepared-sandy-and-fema-knew-it [https://perma.cc/3CGP-FK7C]. Also, given the common
human tendency to discount flood risk, see infra text accompanying notes 65–66, even accurate maps
may be greeted by hostility by those who live in high-risk areas.
56. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 17; Scales, supra note 20, at 12.
57. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 17; Scales, supra note 20, at 43 n.134.
58. KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 17.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Parish of Saint Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1127 (5th Cir. 1985)
(limiting remedies of the United States against Louisiana public and private defendants for violating
their obligations to adopt and enforce flood control measures, thus leading to massive flood damage).
60. U.S. GOV’ T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-12, FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA’S
RATE-SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION 11–18 (2008) [hereinafter FEMA’S RATESETTING]; Scales, supra note 20, at 13.
61. FEMA’S RATE-SETTING, supra note60.
62. Id.; see NFIP: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 1 (NFIP “cannot reject
high-risk applicants.”); Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 32, at 16 (“The NFIP has no ability to deny
coverage if individuals are eligible to purchase the insurance.”); Scales, supra note 20, at 13.
63. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 6 (2d ed. 2008) (describing adverse
selection and the role of insurance as gatekeeper).
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Second, the NFIP’s reach is limited due to common human behavior
concerning risk.64 Despite the subsidies and mandates, people resist buying and
retaining flood insurance, even when they live in high-risk areas. Banks often fail
to ensure that borrowers have and retain flood insurance in flood zones. Much
research has discussed resistance to buying flood insurance and the broader
human tendency to underestimate the magnitude of low-probability, high-impact
risks like floods.65 Floods can happen outside high-risk flood zones, and outside
high-risk zones flood insurance is voluntary. Yet, people outside high-risk zones
rarely buy flood insurance, even though it is inexpensive. The chronically low level
of participation in the program despite the mandates is an important reason why
the NFIP has deficits in addition to the subsidies. It does not have a deep pool of
policyholders to pay for claims.
The way the program has evolved to sell insurance reflects some of the
limitations of the NFIP’s governance. Because of the low demand, Congress made
a shift in 1983 for insurance to be sold by private companies that would receive a
commission and claims adjustment expenses.66 Although the NFIP also sells
insurance, the plan to have private companies sell the insurance was based on the
idea that private companies sell it more effectively than the government.67 Despite
this shift to private sales, participation in the program remains limited.68
Disaster relief creates challenging dilemmas for flood insurance. Federal
disaster relief, activated by a Presidential declaration and supplied by FEMA,
includes both emergency assistance like rescues (also provided by state and local
governments) and some housing assistance.69 This housing assistance includes aid
64. See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY & STACEY MCMORROW, INSURANCE
AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD
INDUSTRY 71–72, 113–15 (2013); see also KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 16; Scales, supra note
20, at 13; Wriggins, supra note 6, at 390–93.
65. See KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 64, at 71–72, 113–15; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra
note 17, at 16; Scales, supra note 20, at 12–13; Wriggins, supra note 6, at 390–93.
66. See KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 85; LLOYD DIXON ET. AL., RAND CORP., THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MARKET PENETRATION RATE 1 (2006),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR300.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BEB-3D2H] (describing limited demand for flood insurance and reasons); Scales,
supra note 20, at 14. This is known as the “Write-Your-Own” (“WYO”) program, although it seems
to be a misnomer because the policies are written by the NFIP. Scales, supra note 20, at 14. The
companies collect premiums, enroll policyholders, and administer claims. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 4071
(2012). Private companies, selling federal policies, are referred to as “fiscal agents” of the federal
government. See 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) (2012).
67. Scales, supra note 20, at 14–15.
68. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 66, at 14 (estimating that forty-nine percent of eligible
properties in high-risk flood areas actually had flood insurance, based on a sample).
69. See Gregory J. Lake, Federal and State Disaster Response: An Introduction, 41 COLO. LAW. 95,
95–96 (2012); FEMA, DISASTER ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FROM FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/
disaster-assistance-available-fema [https://web.archive.org/web/20160118015657/https://www.
fema.gov/disaster-assistance-available-fema] (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) [hereinafter DISASTER
ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FROM FEMA]; FEMA, WHAT IS DISASTER ASSISTANCE?,
http://www.fema.gov/what-disaster-assistance[https://web.archive.org/web/20151204165706/
http://www.fema.gov/what-disaster-assistance] (last visited Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter WHAT IS
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to make damaged homes habitable as well as loans for repairs. FEMA tries to
sharply distinguish between benefits provided by flood insurance and FEMA
emergency housing benefits.70 One area of clear distinction is that FEMA
provides temporary housing, whereas flood insurance does not.71
However, other aspects of housing assistance are more difficult to
distinguish. FEMA’s assistance to make homes habitable overlaps with flood
insurance benefits that provide funds for repairs and reconstruction, which also
helps to make homes habitable.72 FEMA (and the NFIP) requires that
homeowners use flood insurance benefits before they can receive FEMA housing
benefits.73 FEMA publicity urges purchase of flood insurance, rather than receipt
of disaster relief benefits, claiming that insurance puts homeowners more in
control than disaster relief does.74 Nonetheless, as both flood insurance and
FEMA benefits may provide assistance to make flood-damaged homes more
habitable, there is duplication between the two. Further, receiving benefits under
flood insurance policies is not easy; strict deadlines and documentation
requirements apply.75 Press accounts after Hurricane Sandy featured some
individuals who had flood insurance but wished they did not, since they thought
they would have fared better had they relied on disaster relief.76 Not surprisingly,
the availability of federal disaster relief, which has become a political necessity,
may have led to reduced demand for flood insurance.77

DISASTER ASSISTANCE?].
70. See, e.g., DISASTER ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FROM FEMA, supra note 69; WHAT IS
DISASTER ASSISTANCE?, supra note 69.
71. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 66, at 54.
72. Additional research on the overlap between flood insurance benefits and some types of
disaster relief may reveal grounds for possible additional reforms.
73. DISASTER ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FROM FEMA, supra note 69; WHAT IS DISASTER
ASSISTANCE?, supra note 69; see FEMA, DO I QUALIFY FOR ASSISTANCE?, http://www.fema.gov/
do-i-qualify-assistance [https://perma.cc/9JSD-HWXC] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“Please note: If
your disaster damages are covered by your insurance policy, you must file a claim with your insurance
company.”); Is Disaster Help Available If I Have Insurance?, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disaster-helpavailable-if-i-have-insurance [http://web.archive.org/web/20150905092142/http://www.fema.gov/
disaster-help-available-if-i-have-insurance] (last updated Sept. 5, 2015) (stating that a claim must be
filed with an insurance company before disaster help from FEMA can be considered).
74. FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: THE BENEFITS OF FLOOD
INSURANCE VERSUS DISASTER ASSISTANCE (2012), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
20130726-1643-20490-9801/f_217_benefits_30nov2012_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5SN-W76P].
75. Scales, supra note 20, at 14, 33.
76. See, e.g., Alan Krawitz, After Flood Insurance Problems Persist, Some in South Queens, Rockaway
Say They Feel They Would Have Fared Better Without It, F ORUM (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://theforumnewsgroup.com/2014/01/09/after-flood-insurance-problems-persist-some-insouth-queens-rockaway-say-they-feel-they-would-have-fared-better-without-it/
[https://perma.cc/
PZ98-Y94Z].
77. ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUS. AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, HAVE WE ENTERED AN EVER-GROWING CYCLE ON GOVERNMENT
DISASTER RELIEF? (2013), http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/US-Senate-Small-BusinessCte_2013Mar14_MichelKerjan.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3MX-ZYXM].
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D. The Current Situation of the NFIP
Almost fifty years after the NFIP was founded, disaster relief costs are still
soaring. Development has not been guided away from flood-prone areas. To the
contrary, development has been encouraged in these areas, although NFIP
requirements have made most new construction more flood-resistant. The heavily
subsidized insurance for the oldest, highest-risk properties and other properties
affected by map changes has discouraged their replacement. Human behavior
toward flood risk has meant that people tend not to buy flood insurance
voluntarily and let it lapse frequently. The low rate of participation in the program
and massive storms such as Katrina and Sandy have led to huge, enduring deficits
that are now widely seen as problematic. The NFIP cannot enforce local building
codes, must limit its prices, and cannot exclude properties as too risky to insure.
Federal disaster relief provides some housing assistance benefits that overlap with
flood insurance, thereby undercutting incentives to purchase or retain flood
insurance.
The current NFIP and federal flood policy, painted in broad-brush here, are
widely criticized.78 Further, climate change is likely to result in rising sea levels,
larger storms, and more floods.79 In July 2012, Congress passed a law to reform
the program, gradually eliminating all subsidies, moving to risk-based rates, and
creating a plan for a reserve fund to cover catastrophe years.80 It also funded flood
mapping and specified both that private flood insurance satisfied the mandates
and that the NFIP could buy insurance to cover claims that were larger than its
assets, which is known as reinsurance.81 If the NFIP has reinsurance, the
reinsurance policy, rather than taxpayers, should cover claims when claims exceed
capacity.82 Returning the NFIP to fiscal solvency was a widely accepted, dominant
goal.83 The aim was to gradually have rates for flood insurance reflect actual flood
risk. If homeowners were charged rates that reflected actual risk, the program
would be fiscally sound going forward. After some of the 2012 reforms began to
go into effect, the real estate industry and the potentially affected homeowners
energetically lobbied Congress to stop the rate increases that would eventually

78. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 393–97; see, e.g., Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer,
Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471 (2007); Luke
& Abramovsky, supra note 32; Scales, supra note 20.
79. Wriggins, supra note 6, at 366 n.15.
80. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100201–49,
126 Stat. 405, 916–69 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012)).
81. See generally ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 998–99 (5th ed. 2012); NAT’ L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD
INSURANCE REFORM AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2012 (2012), http://www.naic.org/
documents/cipr_events_2012_cipr_summit_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LL2-YBDB]; FEMA,
supra note 20.
82. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 81, at 995.
83. See generally MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 2; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS., supra note 81; FEMA, supra note 20.
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ensue from removing subsidies.84 Congress responded by backtracking on some
of the subsidy removals and made other changes in 2014.85 In 2017, Congress will
revisit the program.86 The next section considers what sort of federal approach to
flood insurance would improve the current situation.
II. BETTER FLOOD INSURANCE
Between now and 2017 there exists an opportunity for widespread education
about the risks and costs of climate change and floods. The public has a chance to
consider what sort of approach to take to flood risk and federal flood insurance.
Congress, the media, and the public now have time to consider and reframe the
issues in a way that is more thoughtful than a panicked response to potential rate
increases. This Section will consider what sort of insurance we should endorse for
flood risk going forward. First, mapping should be adequately funded and
protected from political influence. Second, subsidies should gradually be phased
out and risk-based rates adopted for flood insurance. Third, a targeted
affordability plan should be passed. Fourth, a comprehensive strategy should be
developed to deal with the long-term effects of floods and climate change.
A. Mapping Should Be Funded and Protected from Political Influence
The mapping of flood risk must be based on the most precise scientific
information available.87 At some point in the future, with computer mapping,
flood risk information may be so widely available that the NFIP may not need to
generate maps. That point has not yet been reached. Maps must be as accurate as
possible so that the risk of flood can be gauged with maximum accuracy. In turn,
an accurate estimation of flood risk can lead to an accurate calculation of
premiums based on it. If the premiums are based on accurate risk predictions,
then the program should not run deficits. Opponents of rate reform have been
able to point to the mapping program’s weakness as a way to attack suggested
reforms, and excellent maps will foreclose this objection.88

84. Robert R. M. Verchick & Linsey R. Johnson, When Retreat Is the Best Option: Flood Insurance
after Biggert-Waters and other Climate Change Puzzles, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 695, 711, 716 (2013);
Wriggins, supra note 6, at 413–20 (analyzing the efforts to derail the 2012 reforms).
85. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§ 3–4, 128
Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014(g), 4015).
86. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100203(b),
126 Stat. 405, 916 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4026 (2012)).
87. For more discussion of mapping, see Wriggins, supra note 6, at 401–02, 408, 421–22.
Provisions about mapping in BW-12 and MG-14 include Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act
of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100216(b)(1)(A)(iii), 100216(b)(1)(C).
88. See, e.g., FEMA’S RATE-SETTING, supra note 60, at 16–17, 30; see also, e.g., NFIP:
CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 17, at 7; KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 16; Luke
& Abramovsky, supra note 32, at 9–10; STOP FEMA NOW, http://www.stopfemanow.com
[https://perma.cc/C2X5-TXUC] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
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B. Subsidies Should Be Phased Out
The remaining subsidies should be gradually phased out. Congress in 2014,
to its credit, continued with the rollback of some of the subsidies. The
longstanding subsidies for flood insurance policies on high-risk older homes (the
pre-FIRM subsidies) applied not only to policies on primary residences but even
to policies on second homes, businesses, and properties that had repeatedly
suffered large losses. In 2014, Congress continued with the gradual elimination of
those subsidies for policies on second homes, business properties, and severe
repetitive loss properties.89 Those subsidies apply to about 425,000 properties.90
However, approximately 715,000 subsidized policies on high-risk properties
remain and were renewed by Congress in 2014.91 These subsidies apply to primary
residences and also to some properties that have become more high risk over the
years—the grandfathering subsidies mentioned above. These subsidies should end
for several reasons. First, risk-based rates will probably bring private competition
and state insurance regulation; competition and state regulation will likely be
overall more efficient and better for consumers than the current system. Second,
the justifications for continuing these subsidies are specious. Third, other areas of
the federal government’s involvement in insurance are far more compelling from a
policy standpoint than flood insurance. Fourth, the incentives created by the
subsidies make little sense, particularly given climate change risks. Instead of the
current subsidies, there should be a voucher program which is means-tested and
narrow. Finally, Congress should develop a plan to face the realities of climate
change, including rising sea levels.

89. The 2012 reforms eliminated subsidies for 438,000 policyholders—for second homes,
businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 12.
The 2014 reforms continued with the elimination of these subsidies. See FEMA, HOMEOWNER
FLOOD INSURANCE AFFORDABILITY ACT: OVERVIEW (2014), http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/1396551935597-4048b68f6d695a6eb6e6e7118d3ce464/HFIAA_Overview_FINAL_03282014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F3HZ-677H]. But 715,000 subsidized properties remained. MORE INFORMATION
NEEDED, supra note 20, at 12. Policy holders who had subsidized policies for nonprimary residences,
businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties (a total of five percent of flood policyholders)
received twenty-five percent premium increases starting January 1, 2013. FEMA, supra note 20, at 1–
2. “Severe repetitive loss” properties are defined as single family residences that have suffered flood
damage for which four or more claims have been made, each greater than $5000 or at least two claims
have been made with the total amount exceeding the value of the property. 42 U.S.C. §
4104c(h)(1)(B) (2012).
90. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 12–13.
91. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 § 4 (“Restoration of
Grandfathered Rates”). This provision repealed section 1308 of the National Flood Insurance Act of
1968 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq.), which required premium adjustments to reflect the current
risk of flood based on updated maps and stated that premiums could rise twenty percent per year
following new flood maps. Id.; National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4015(h) (2012)
(repealed 2014).
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Risk-Based Rates Will Be Positive and Probably Bring Increased Private Competition

The federal government’s deeply subsidized rates have hampered the private
market’s ability to provide basic homeowners flood coverage and have inhibited
private competition.92 While flood risk is a difficult, correlated risk that the private
market has been reluctant to cover, private insurance may become more
widespread if the federal government reduces subsidies and improves mapping.
Interestingly, Lloyds of London is offering some basic private flood insurance in
Florida, which in some instances is cheaper than coverage through the NFIP.93
Private insurers are better at some aspects of risk reduction than governments.94 If
rates become based on risk, better risk modeling information will probably
become available, thus furthering competition between private insurers.95 Private
insurers may be able to provide more variety in policies as well as more nuanced
rate making, better data, and individualized risk management. If private insurance
begins to cover this risk, consumer-friendly state insurance law doctrines will
begin to apply.96 Even an expansion of the private market will not mean an
absence of a federal role. The federal government may need to be involved in an
affordability program, discussed below, as well as perhaps playing a role in
providing reinsurance.97
2.

The Justifications for Continuing the Subsidies Are Specious

Second, the justification for the subsidies has not been persuasively made.
Subsidy proponents have not made arguments on the merits as to why the
subsidies are a positive idea, except to say that flood insurance rates should not be
too high.98 The original justification for the subsidies, encouraging participation in
the program, is stale and no longer valid.99 The subsidies are not based on need or
income. They are based on factors such as the age of the house, its location,
mapping history, and risk.100 The subsidies were originally instituted to encourage
92. See FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 5–6.
93. See Jeff Harrington, Battling Flood Insurance Rate Hikes Without Government Help, TAMPA BAY
TIMES ( Jan. 12, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/battlingflood-insurance-rate-hikes-without-government-help/2160697 [https://perma.cc/N5YC-ZXR3]
(reporting that Lloyd’s of London is now offering flood insurance in Florida).
94. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral
Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 224 n.85 (2012) (providing example of private insurers using
hurricane shutters to reduce insurance premiums).
95. Of course, as risk modeling becomes more granular and individualized, difficult questions
of cross-subsidization may come to the fore.
96. See Scales, supra note 20, at 33–34.
97. FLOOD INSURANCE: STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 21–22.
98. See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 413–17, 414 n.322.
99. Congress initiated the subsidies when it founded the program in order to encourage
participation in the program. U.S. GOV ’ T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 20, at 1, 9; FEMA,
supra note 20, at 7; Scales, supra note 20, at 16.
100. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED, supra note 20, at 2 n.2; FEMA ACTION NEEDED, supra
note 20, at 52 (2011) (reporting that rates for older properties in high-risk zones are forty to forty-five
percent of what full risk rates would be).
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participation in a new program and were expected to last for twenty-five years, by
which time the older properties would be replaced by newer, more flood-resistant
ones.101 However, the older properties have endured and in some cases increased
substantially in value.102 The real estate industry in coastal areas, we can assume,
relies to some degree on the availability of affordable flood insurance.103 But the
proponents of these enduring subsidies on primary residences and grandfathering
subsidies have not explained why they, along with the real estate industry in their
areas, should receive these particular subsidies. Nor have they articulated why
deeply discounted, federally supplied property insurance should be denied to
homeowners outside high-risk coastal or riverine areas.
Not all subsidies are the same, and not all risks should be spread across all
taxpayers. The way in which the federal government spreads flood risk makes little
sense now. This is not to say that the government generally should return all
widely spread risks to the backs of individuals.104 Rather, one can oppose some of
the ways in which the government has returned risk to individuals in recent
decades, such as the shrinking of retirement security, and also oppose the way
government spreads flood risk.105
3.

Other Arenas of Federal Government Involvement with Insurance Reflect More Compelling
Policy Justifications than Flood Insurance

If we consider three areas where the federal government has been involved
with insurance, we can see that the case for continuing federal subsidies is much
more problematic. One context is the Urban Property Insurance Protection and
Reinsurance Act of 1968 (UPIPRA).106 This law, passed in 1968, was aimed at the
challenges posed by a lack of insurance in urban areas both before and after the
urban riots of 1966.107 This law authorized states to pass statutes known as Fair
Access to Insurance Requirements plans (FAIR plans) and provided federal riot
reinsurance to companies that participated in FAIR plans.108 The major goal of
101. WETMORE ET AL., supra note 37, at 12–20.
102. Id.
103. Witness the real estate industry’s passionate opposition to the 2012 changes in the flood
insurance law. See Editorial, Flooding Capitol Hill: Republicans Cave to the Realtors on Taxpayer Flood
Insurance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2014, at A16.
104. See generally SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, SHARED RISK: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ( Jacob S. Hacker & Ann O’Leary eds., 2012).
105. Id.
106. Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat.
555 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb–1749bbb-21 (1976)), amended by Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2080 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
107. PRESIDENT ’ S NAT ’ L ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS, MEETING
THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES, at ii–iii (1968) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL ON INS.
REPORT]; Joanne Dwyer, Fair Plans: History, Holtzman and the Arson-for-Profit Hazard, 7 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 617, 617, 622–23, 626 (1978); Alan S. Kaplinsky, Insurance in Urban Areas: An Analysis of
Recent Statutory Solutions, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 650, 662 (1969).
108. Dwyer, supra note 107, at 621–22.

Wriggins_Post Production read_ PC Clean Up (1).docx (Do Not Delete)

1458

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

7/1/2016 9:36 AM

[Vol. 5:1443

these plans was to make affordable property insurance more available in urban
areas.109 These plans varied according to state laws but needed to meet basic
federal requirements in order for companies to receive federal reinsurance for
riots.110
Eventually, private reinsurers returned to the market and Congress
terminated the riot reinsurance program in 1985.111 Now, the standard policies of
homeowners cover riots.112 UPIPRA aimed to deal with a national emergency of
widespread urban decline that threatened the survival of U.S. cities. Insurance
companies had been refusing to insure properties in large areas of cities,
particularly those inhabited by minorities; this refusal to insure contributed
significantly to the decline of these large urban areas. Individuals who owned
property in these areas often were simply unable to obtain insurance. States and
cities did not have the resources to deal with the situation.113 The federal
government’s involvement was limited in scope, finite in duration, and targeted a
beneficial goal. The federal government did not take over the entire underwriting
risk, but rather created incentives for states to prod insurance companies to take
on some of the risk because of the importance of the coverage.
Flood insurance contrasts unfavorably with this example. The federal
government has entirely underwritten flood risk for homeowners, the subsidies
have endured for decades, federal involvement is widely seen as having led to
significant negative consequences such as retaining risky properties that otherwise
would have been replaced, and the risk that the federal government has
shouldered is one that many homeowners choose to face.
A second area of instructive contrast is federal unemployment insurance.
Passed in 1935, the law establishing federal unemployment insurance aimed to fill
a void in the private market. There was no private unemployment insurance
available on the market, apparently because of concern about the challenge of
distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary employment and moral
hazard.114 The structure was a payroll tax on the majority of employees; those who
participated in a satisfactory state unemployment insurance program could deduct

109.
110.
111.

Urban Property Insurance Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 § 1103.
Dwyer, supra note 107, at 621–28.
12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb(b) (omitted); BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42716,
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE 8 (2013).
112. U.S. GOV ’ T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE:
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 9 (2014) [hereinafter
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE].
113. ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. REPORT, supra note 107, at 32; Dwyer, supra note 107, at 617.
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders set up the distinct National Advisory Panel
on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, which later endorsed the report of the Advisory Panel on
Insurance. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 197–99 (1968); Dwyer, supra note 107, at 617.
114. U.S. DEP ’ T OF LABOR , UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 75TH ANNIVERSARY ,
http://www.dol.gov/ocia/pdf/75th-Anniversary-Summary-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR77YH6R] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016); MOSS, supra note 14, at 197–98.
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the full amount of their state contributions from the federal tax.115 The goal was
to help stabilize the economy and lessen individual hardship from job loss that
was not an individual’s fault.116 Payments from states are supplemented by the
federal government at times of economic hardship.117 Many aspects of the
program can be questioned, but the need for stabilizing the economy was and
sometimes is compelling.118 States, cities, employers, and the private market lack
the resources to deal with the economic consequences of widespread
unemployment, and federal unemployment insurance helps stabilize the
economy.119 Federal unemployment insurance spreads a risk that is not within the
control of individuals and that almost everyone faces.
The third example is the Affordable Care Act that was passed in 2010 when
40 million Americans did not have health insurance.120 Although it may be
difficult to remember now, this was a time when there was a consensus across the
political spectrum that the private health insurance market was not working well
and that reform was needed so that more individuals could have health
insurance.121 While concerns were raised about costs, bureaucracy, and so on, this
is a context where government’s involvement in insurance markets made sense.
The risk of illness—though unevenly distributed—is universally shared and
outside the control of individuals, and public health concerns support wide
provision of healthcare to citizens.122
These three contexts, insurance in urban areas, unemployment insurance,
and the Affordable Care Act, present much more compelling reasons for the
federal government’s involvement in insurance than does flood insurance. Even if
there are strong reasons for the federal government’s involvement with flood
insurance, the case for the present subsidies is weak.
115. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 114; MOSS, supra note 14, at 191.
116. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 114.
117. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, Advocates Renew Efforts to Urge Congress to Extend Unemployment
Benefits, WASH. POST ( June 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/advocates-renewefforts-to-urge-congress-to-extend-unemployment-benefits/2014/06/10/2224da50-eff0-11e3-914c1fbd0614e2d4_story.html [https://perma.cc/8YXR-UEH3].
118. See Brian D. Galle, Myopia, Fiscal Federalism, and Unemployment Insurance: Time to Reform
UI Financing 2–3 (Boston College Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 265, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031728; Arthur Delaney, Conservatives Credit
End of Benefits for Declining Unemployment Rate, HUFFINGTON POST POLITICS ( July 7, 2014, 4:17 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/07unemployment-extension_n_5564019.html
[https://perma.cc/B54F-SM9G].
119. See Galle, supra note 118, at 2–3.
120. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2612 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Brief for Health Care
for All, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398),
2012 WL 160242.
121. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 12
(5th ed. Supp. 2010).
122. Space constraints prevent detailed discussion of these points. For a comparative
perspective, see generally T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER,
CHEAPER, AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE (2010).
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The Subsidies Create Negative Incentives that Are Unfair to the General Public

The third major reason why the subsidies should gradually be phased out is
that the incentives they create are perverse, particularly given climate change.
Existing subsidies incentivize citizens living in flood zones, particularly in older
homes. The current rules encourage building in flood-prone areas, yet the federal
government has no way to enforce land-use restrictions there. Given climate
change and increasing disaster relief costs, there is no strong reason why these
particular subsidies should continue. The subsidies and government rebuilding
efforts permit homeowners and the real estate industry in flood-prone areas to
avoid bearing the costs of the risks they face. Instead, all taxpayers, even those
who are not living in flood-prone areas, ultimately share those ever-increasing
costs.
C. A Means-Tested Voucher Program Should Be Passed to Address Affordability Concerns
Instead of the current subsidies, there should be a voucher program that is
means tested and narrow. Flood insurance is both required and subsidized in highrisk zones. There are good reasons for the mandate,123 but weak reasons for the
general subsidies, as explained above.124 Yet, for low-income residents of high-risk
areas who have mortgages and are subject to the mandate, the gradual elimination
of subsidies would be overly harsh. This raises concerns about affordability for
some homeowners. The 2012 and 2014 reforms both require a National Academy
of Sciences study to develop a possible affordability framework for flood
insurance.125 The provisions about the study, which is intended to set the stage for
the affordability framework, are complex and unlikely to result in a clear answer as
to what Congress should do about affordability. It would be a mistake for
Congress to wait for the affordability study without independently considering
what it should do about the issue.
One response to the affordability concern is to say that if the cost of owning
an asset becomes too high, the owner can generally sell it. High insurance costs
based on the riskiness of a particular property could simply be seen as a market
signal. However, not all flood-prone areas are desirable, and selling may not always
be an option. Some areas may become blighted if rates are based on risk.126
Virtually everyone involved in flood insurance reform calls for consideration of
affordability issues in government insurance policy in this context, although the
123. See supra notes 30–33 (reasons for mandates), 37–46 (effects of subsidies), 92–122
(reasons for phasing out subsidies) and accompanying text.
124. See supra Section II.B.
125. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141,
§ 100236(b), 126 Stat. 957 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012)); Wriggins, supra
note 6, at 400–01, 406–08.
126. See, e.g., JOHN O’NEILL & MARTIN O’NEILL, JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUND., SOCIAL
JUSTICE AND THE FUTURE OF FLOOD INSURANCE (2012), http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/
vulnerable-households-flood-insurance-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z55L-67MQ] (discussing
UK flood insurance regime).
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rationales for these calls are often left unarticulated.127 What are the arguments for
an affordability program for flood insurance? Expert Carolyn Kousky explains in
discussing state natural catastrophe programs that there are basically three
arguments.
The first is a political response to subsidize “vocal, high-risk residents.”128
This is essentially what Congress did when it restored the majority of subsidies
and made other changes in 2014. However, with more time and education, there is
hope for a more reflective response in the future.
The second argument, Kousky explains, is the equity argument. She writes,
“some low-income homeowners reside in high-hazard areas, and it is a
government role to help these homeowners afford insurance, just as society
subsidizes their food and health care.”129
The third is an economic argument. She writes:
[I]nsurance . . . is necessary for development, and some types of
development must be in high-risk areas but provide economic
spillovers that justify insurance subsidies. The extent to which
this is the case is a difficult empirical question that to my
knowledge has not been thoroughly addressed but would likely
justify only very small and targeted subsidies in any event.130
The federal flood insurance program, of course, offers not small and targeted
subsidies but large and general subsidies. Assuming Kousky is correct, these
subsidies would not be economically justified.
The only strong argument for subsidies, then, is the equity argument that
would extend them to poor people as part of government’s role in subsidizing
housing, health care, and food.131 The existing general flood insurance subsidies
for older homes and grandfathered homes are not targeted at people with low
incomes or limited assets. They cover some people in these situations, but also
127. See, e.g., SMARTERSAFER, BRACING FOR THE STORM: HOW TO REFORM US DISASTER
POLICY TO PREPARE FOR A RISKIER FUTURE 3 (2015) (calling for subsidies only for those who truly
cannot afford risk-based rates through a means-tested, time-limited, and transparent system outside
the rate structure); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Implementing The National
Flood Insurance Reform Act in a New Era of Catastrophes, Wharton Pub. Pol’y Initiative Issue Brief, Oct.
2013.
128. CAROLYN KOUSKY, NO. RFF DP 10-30, MANAGING THE RISK OF NATURAL
CATASTROPHES: THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF STATE INSURANCE PROGRAMS 14,
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-10-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CA97-XZCY].
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. While moral hazard arguments are commonly raised in opposition to subsidies for poor
people, see generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996), in this
context these arguments ring particularly false since the enduring subsidies have not had a clear
purpose or strong rationale other than to benefit “vocal high-risk residents,” KOUSKY, supra note
128.
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cover homeowners who are not poor or middle class. For example, wealthy
people with older, oceanfront homes have received massive subsidies for almost
fifty years. If their home is their primary residence, they still receive the subsidies
with only small rate increases authorized by Congress. The rates for standard
homeowners insurance (which does not cover floods) vary by type and degree of
risk, including materials and probability of exposure to catastrophes.132 But flood
risk enjoys a most favored risk status for no valid reason.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), academic experts, and
private organizations have charted a route out of the current untenable situation.
They argue that Congress should eliminate subsidized rates gradually and charge
risk-based rates to everyone but also fund a means-tested subsidy for some
policyholders.133 The most specific plan was put forth by Prof. Howard
Kunreuther and his colleagues, including Carolyn Kousky and Erwann MichelKerjan.134 They propose a means-tested program using vouchers coupled with
loans for mitigation renovations.135 Even though many details would need to be
worked out, and politics may prevent passage of such a plan, it would represent a
significant improvement over the current situation.
D. Congress Should Pass a Comprehensive Climate Change Plan
Finally, Congress should pass a regulatory scheme to deal with floods and
climate change.136 Even with the improvements suggested above, such as gradual
removal of subsidies, if climate change and sea level rise predictions come to pass,
the reforms will be insufficient.
CONCLUSION
Flood insurance presents few easy issues, particularly given increasing flood
risks, structural limitations on federal power, human behavior towards flood risk,
and how politically challenging it is to take away government benefits after they
have been given. But despite these challenges, we need to have a broader
conversation about flood risk and how we are going to deal with it as a society.
This conversation must take place between now and 2017, when Congress revisits
the program. Continuation of the current government insurance regime, with its
incentives to increase the amount of new property at risk and to retain older high132. HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE, supra note 114, at 5.
133. Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, Addressing Affordability in the National Flood
Insurance Program, J. EXTREME EVENTS , Aug. 2014, at 1450001-3; see KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note
17, at 333.
134. Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 133, at 3.
135. Id. at 1; see KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 17, at 333.
136. The original law establishing the National Flood Insurance Program called for creation of
a national floodplain management program, 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c), a goal that has not been realized. See,
e.g., Josh Saks & Jimi Grande, Flood Insurance Vote Underscores Need for National Mitigation Strategy, ROLL
CALL (Apr. 21, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/flood_insurance_vote_underscores
_need_for_national_mitigation_strategy-232238-1.html [https://perma.cc/8BNF-R2XQ].
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risk homes, makes little sense. Developing excellent maps, gradually moving to
risk-based rates, and developing a needs-based voucher program would
substantially improve the current system. Further, these improvements would
begin to point us in the right general direction of dealing with the challenges
presented by climate change.

